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               Culture and Corporate Governance Convergence  
 
  
This paper analyses the link between culture and corporate governance. In particular, it 
demonstrates the impact of culture in inhibiting convergence of corporate governance.   
Overall, the paper provides an appraisal of corporate governance laws in stakeholder-
oriented States that have endured market pressure for convergence. It reveals a strong 
propensity for cultural norms to dictate regulatory reforms. The paper illustrates that 
alterations towards shareholder-oriented model is mostly in areas where States seek to 
enhance transparency and accountability to attract capital as oppose to the assertion that 
shareholder-oriented model is more efficient. It advances the convergence debate by 
asserting the implications of social institutions on regulatory reform of corporate 
governance.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The prominent view in the convergence of corporate governance debate contends that states 
are altering their corporate governance rules and practices towards the Anglo-American 
shareholder-oriented model1 as opposed to a logical system, where the most effective best 
prevails.2 The above view is based on the economic argument that the shareholder-oriented 
                                                 
1  Mary O’Sullivan, “The Political Economy of Comparative Corporate Governance”  Review of International 
Political Economy 10 (2003).   
2 Hall and Soskice (2001), Variety of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundation of Comparative Advantage 
(2001) Oxford University Press; P. Milgrom, and J. Roberts (1995) Complementarities and Fit: Structure and 
Organisational Chang in Manufacturing’ (1995)19 Journal of Accounting and Economics 179. 
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model is most effective at allocating resources to the most efficient use.3  The diffusion of 
corporate governance codes originating from shareholder-oriented states around the world is 
also perceived as convergence towards this model.4 Furthermore, the fact that many more 
companies are listed on stock exchanges in the UK and US is viewed as a sign of superiority 
of their corporate governance system,5 though it is strongly argued that those who hold the 
view that convergence is moving towards the shareholders’ model are from the US.6   
Cultural and institutional factors are also pivotal in the outcome of corporate 
governance regulation.7 As Branson8 and Licht9  propositioned, diversity in cultural practices 
amongst states will ensure that corporate governance rules and practices remain divergent. 
Yet few studies have analyzed its impact on corporate governance convergence. Licht et al 
for instance examined if the law reflects cultural values, which has some implications for the 
convergence debate but the paper does not directly analyze the effect of culture on the 
convergence process.10 Haxhi and Ees11 and Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra12 studied the 
cultural and psychological aspects of the global diffusion of codes but not on rules and 
                                                 
3 H.B. Hansmann and R. H. Kraakman , ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’, (2001) 89 Georgetown Law 
Journal 439; R. Rajan and L. Zingales, ‘The Greatest Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 
20th Century’,  (2003) 9 Journal of Financial Economics 5.   
4 I. Haxhi and H.V. Ees, ‘Explaining diversity in the worldwide diffusion of codes of good governance’, (2010) 
41 Journal of International Business Studies 710.  
5 R.J. Gilson, R. J. ‘Globalising corporate governance: Convergence of form or function’, (2001) 49 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 329. 
6 D.M. Branson, ‘The Very Uncertain Prospect of “Global” Convergence in Corporate Governance’ (2001) 34 
Cornell International Law Journal 324; B.H. McDonnell, ‘ Convergence in Corporate Governance – Possible 
But Not Desirable’ (2002), 47 Villanova Law Review 341.  
7 J. Groenewegen, ‘Who Should Control the Corporation? Insights from New and Original Institutional 
Economics’ (2004) 38 Journal of Economic Issues 353; R. Aguilera and G. Jackson, ‘The Cross-national 
Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants’ (2003)28 Academy of Management Review 
447. 
8 Branson, Op cit., n. 6   
9A. N. Licht, ‘The Mother of All Path Dependencies – Towards a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate 
Governance Systems’(2001) 26 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 147.  
10 A.N. Licht et al., ‘Culture, Law and Corporate Governance’, (2005) 25 International Review of Law and 
Economics 229.   
11 Haxhi and Ees, Op cit, n. 4 
12 R.V. Aguilera and A. Cuervo-Cazurra, ‘Codes of good governance worldwide: What is the trigger?’ (2004) 
25 Organization Studies 415.   
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principles in stakeholders’ states that have endured the convergence process and the direct 
role of culture in the divergence of corporate governance.  
This paper is aimed at filling this gap by analyzing the relationship between cultural 
values and the convergence or divergence of corporate governance regulation in 
stakeholders-oriented states. As McDonnell states, “most commentators have focused on 
efficiency to the exclusion of other values.”13 Its aim is to project the cultural ideologies 
dictating the convergence or divergence of corporate governance regulation overlooked in the 
convergence debate. The paper also highlights other channels of influence in the convergence 
or divergence of corporate governance regulation other than the market and at firm level and 
illustrates the conscious efforts of states to restrict market forces interfering in their corporate 
cultural values through the enactment of rules and principles that are concurrent with national 
cultural norms.   
In this regard, the paper analyses the corporate cultural values of six states in three 
different continents and illustrates the link between their cultural values and their corporate 
governance laws. For lucidity, we compare rules that have remained unaffected as a result of 
national cultural norms and rules and principles that have been altered via the market or at 
firm level as a result of globalization.         
To that end, the following two sections examine the definition of culture and the 
cultural features of the shareholder-oriented model and differentiate them from defining 
features of the stakeholder-oriented model. The paper then analyses the impact of culture on 
the convergence of corporate governance in six countries with stakeholder-oriented model of 
corporate governance. The last section explains the effect that cultural differences amongst 
states play in the divergence of corporate governance regulation. In conclusion, it is argued 
that, while the market and foreign managers in stakeholders’ states are influencing corporate 
                                                 
13 McDonnell, Op cit, n 6, p. 341. 
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governance rules and principles towards the shareholder-oriented model, the desire of states 
to maintain their cultural values and corporate ideologies would ensure that there is diversity 
of corporate governance models. Changes have typically occurred in areas of transparency 
and accountability where these states seek to attract capital, while rules and principles derived 
from core cultural features have remained unaltered.   
 
11. Culture and Corporate Governance  
 
1. Culture Defined   
Culture is a complex concept with no consensus as to the exact meaning of the term. 
However, it is agreed to consist of shared values, belief system and behavioral norms by a 
group of people.14 It has also been defined as attitudes and practices shared by members of a 
collective, such as a community or a firm.15 Culture is also viewed as “an integrated pattern 
of basic assumptions, values and artifacts that set the stage for action, belief and policy.”16  
This paper borrows from Salacuse and Frederick in defining culture as values, attitudes and 
norms that set the stage for action, belief and policy.17  This definition emphasizes culture as 
an institution that lays the ground rules around which state organs function and was chosen 
for this reason. It is often passed down from generation to generation and is usually easily 
accepted when it adds value to an organization.18  
                                                 
14 J.P. Kotter and J.L. Heskett,  Corporate Culture and Performance (1992) The Free Press;    D.A. Ralston  et 
al., ‘Differences in Managerial Values: A Study of US, Hong Kong and PRC Managers’ (1993) 24 Journal of 
International Business Studies 249.   
15 G. Hofstede, Culture’s Consequence: Comparing Values, Behaviour, Institutions, and Organisations Across 
Nations, (2003) Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
16 W.C. Frederick, (1995), Values Nature and Culture in the American Corporation,  Oxford University Press, 
p. 88 
17 J.W. Salacuse, (1999), ‘Intercultural Negotiation in International Business’ (1999) 8 Group Decision and 
Negotiation 217; Frederick, ibid.   
18 E.H. Schein, The Corporate Cultural Survival Guide (2009, New ed.) Wiley. 
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Values are the foundation of a culture as they shape attitudes and practices and are 
instrumental in the design of state rules.19 For instance, individualism and collectivism has 
been identified as core values affecting societal view of the objective of corporations.20 
Leaders, politicians, policy-makers, managers and individuals draw on their cultural values to 
select, evaluate and justify their actions.21   
Thus, the paper utilizes the main corporate cultural values identified by scholars in each 
of the country in the study and examines their influence on corporate governance rules and 
principles through the creation of laws by the government that reflects these values. In order 
to contrast the cultural traits of the stakeholder-oriented model with the shareholder-oriented 
model, we identifying the cultural attributes of both models.  
 
2. Cultural Attributes of the Dominant Models  
There are a variety of corporate governance systems and models. Weimer and Pape identify 
up to four systems; the Anglo-Saxon system, the Germanic system, the Latin system and the 
Japanese system.22 However, two dominant corporate governance models, the Anglo-
American shareholder-oriented model and the stakeholder-oriented model have eroded the 
rest and studies on convergence of corporate governance clearly indicate that these are the 
two models competing against each other.23 In fact, reference to convergence towards the 
shareholder-oriented model is often an argument of the stakeholder-oriented model being 
substituted with the shareholder-oriented model. While this paper acknowledges the failure of 
convergence scholarship to look beyond these two models, for the simple reason that the two 
models are the most well established, the paper follows the same trend by utilizing 
                                                 
19 J.W. Salacuse, ‘Corporate Governance, Culture and Convergence: Corporations American Style or With a 
European Touch’ (2003) 9 Law & Business Rev. Am 33.  
20 F. Trompenaars and C. Hampden-Turner , The Seven Cultures of Capitalisms, (1993) London: Piatkus.  
21 Litch et al., op cit, n 10. 
22 J.Weimer and J.C. Pape, ‘A Taxonomy of Systems of Corporate Governance’, (1999) 7 Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 152.  
23 Hansmann and Kraakman ,Op cit, n. 3 
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persistence of the stakeholder model as illustration of non-convergence towards the 
shareholder-oriented model. Moreover, cultural features of the stakeholder model are clearly 
in stark contrast to the shareholder model and illustrate divergence from shareholder model 
more clearly. Thus, it is pertinent to capture the main cultural features that distinguish 
shareholder model from the stakeholder model.    
One of the main features that distinguish the shareholder model from the stakeholder 
model is their perceived objective of the firm. States with shareholder-oriented model such as 
US and UK are individualistic and the firm is managed for the interest of shareholders (Dore 
2000).24 As a result, there are robust legal mechanisms to ensure that shareholders’ rights are 
effectively protected.25 Take-overs are very common as underperforming companies are 
taken-over by more efficient companies. On the contrary, stakeholder-oriented states 
discourage hostile take-overs and shareholder driven stimulus.  The stock market is not as 
developed and significant as a source of finance. This explains why changes in the corporate 
law of several stakeholder states towards the development of their stock markets are 
perceived as a movement towards the shareholder model.26  
Furthermore, in countries with stakeholder model, in keeping with their 
communitarian values where the company is managed for the interest of all stakeholders and 
not only for the interest of shareholders as in shareholder states,27 employees play a 
significant role in the management of the firm through their representation on the board as in 
Germany and Japan.28 The system promotes an equalitarian culture where corporations are 
managed for the good of all not just the maximization of profit for shareholders.  
                                                 
24 R.P. Dore, Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism: Japan and German Versus the Anglo-Saxon (2000) 
Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
25 R. La Porta et al , ‘Corporate Ownership Around the World’,  (1999) 54 Journal of Finance 471. 
26 T. Khanna et al, ‘Globalization and disimilarities in corporate governance: A cross-country analysis’ (2006) 
88 The Review of Economics and Statistics 69.   
27 M.A. Witts, ‘Convergence 10 Years on: Impact and Further Potential’ (2008) 39 Journal of International 
Business Studies 47.  
28 Hofstede, po., n. 15 
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Stakeholders’ states are also known to advance the long-term interest of the company as 
oppose to short term interest maximization synonymous with the shareholder-oriented 
model.29    
 
Table 1 Cultural Features of the two Dominant Corporate governance models  
  
Shareholder-oriented       
Model  
Cultural Features  Stakeholder Oriented 
Model  
Individualism  Core Values  Communitarianism/ collectivism   
Short term profit maximisation  Attitude  Long term value maximisation  
No labour representation  in 
decision- making   
Norm Involvement of labour in 
decision –making  
No employees on boards Action Employee representatives on 
boards  
Liberalism  Belief Welfare  
Private cupidity  Policy  Social responsibility  
 
 
 
 
111. The Impact of National Culture on the Convergence of Corporate Governance 
Regulation  
This section of the paper examines the corporate cultural values of each country in the study 
and their impact on the corporate governance laws of the country. Corporate governance laws 
are scattered in different parts of a country’s corporate law, general commercial codes, 
bankruptcy codes, financial regulation corporate governance codes and labor law.30 Thus, an 
examination of corporate governance regulation would involve a dissection of all these 
                                                 
29 T. Randal and J. Nielsen (2002) ‘Company performance, corporate governance and CEO compensation in 
Morway and Sweden’ (2002) 6 Journal of Management and Governance 57; K. William, 2000, ‘From 
shareholder Value to present –day capitalism’ (2000) 29 Economy and society 80. 
30  M. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance. (1994) New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press.  
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different laws. An assessment of Germany and France in Europe is provided. As McDonnell 
asserts, most of the convergence literature has focused on wealthy countries in Europe, North 
America and part of East Asia.31 In this regard, this paper extends the convergence literature 
by including emerging economies in Africa.   
 
1. European Model    
Europe is the most studied continent in convergence literature especially Germany. For 
instance Lane32 analyses convergence in Germany and its effect on labor, while Sullivan 
examines convergence in France and Germany.33 Others studies have examine changes in the 
German capital market and its ramifications for corporate governance in the country.34     
A few studies have also examined convergence in France and the many changes of 
government policies on corporations.35   
  
(a) France 
As a socialist state, corporations in France are managed for the interest of all stakeholders, 
what is commonly known as social interest or ‘l'intérêt social’.36 Traditional features of 
French corporate culture are: the stronghold of the state in corporate affairs through state 
ownership of corporate shares, heavy reliance on external debts for finance, elitism and labor 
                                                 
31 McDonnell, op cit., n. 6. 
32 C. Lane, ‘Changes in corporate governance of German corporations: Convergence to the Anglo-Saxon 
model?’ (2003) 7 Competition and Change 79. 
33 O’Sullivan, op cit., n. 1.  
34 T, Edwards, ‘Corporate governance, industrial relations and trends in company-level restructuring in Europe: 
Convergence towards the Anglo-American model?’ (2004) 33 Industrial Relations Journal 518; G. Jackson and 
A. Moerke, ‘Continuity and change in corporate governance: Comparing Germany and Japan’ (2005) 3 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 351. 
35 O’Sullivan, op cit., n.1; Edwards, op cit., n. 33; M. Goyer, 002. The transformation of corporate governance 
in France and Germany: The role of workplace institutions. (2002) MPlfG Working paper, No. 02/10. 
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44262  
36 A. Couret, ‘Interet social et responsibilite penale des dirigeants’ (1996) 111 Revue Francaise de Gestion 76. 
A.J. Fanto, ‘The transformation of French corporate governance and United States institutional investors’ (1997) 
21 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1. 
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representation.37 These features developed from the French ethics of collectivism, respect for 
authority and reinforcement of norms which are core values long implanted in French 
corporate culture and tradition.38  
Consequently, successive French rulers such as Louis XIV, Napoleon and leaders 
after the Second World War, instituted a centralized administration based on personal 
relationships and appointed leaders to carry out their policies in different areas including the 
corporate realm especially as most corporations were state-owned.39 State ownership of firms 
also provided a medium for socialization and buttressing of French cultural values outlined 
by the government. The French generally do not trust private individuals to provide for public 
goods and the Jacobeans had long instilled a tradition where the state caters for the general 
interest of society.40 This explains the state’s tight grip on ownership of corporations and the 
use of directors appointed from a close circle of elites to implement government policies.   
Family ownership is also prevalent as well as block ownership and cross-
shareholdings between firms owned by the same group of elites.41 Generally, family finance, 
the state and banks were the traditional sources of capital for large corporation. As a result 
the capital market was underdeveloped and was not a primary source of capital.42 It also 
developed an elite class consisting of former students of the two top universities in France 
often referred to as ‘grandes ecoles.’43 They make up a majority of board members and are 
usually appointed through their affiliation with the president-directeur general (PDG) or their 
                                                 
37 A.B. Antal and A. Sobczak, ‘Corporate social responsibility in France: A mix of national traditions and 
international influences’ (2007) 46 Business and Society 9-32; O’Sullivan, op cit., n. 1.  
38 H.M. Lubatkin et al, ‘Origins of corporate governance in USA, Sweden and France’ (2005) 26 Organization 
Studies 867. 
39 J. Barsoux, J. and P. Lawrence, Management in France, (1990) London: Cassell; G. Duby, ‘L’Urbanisation 
dans l’histoire’ (1973) 49 Etudes Rurale 10. 
40 B. Halba, 2003. Les facettes de la responsabilité social: Le cas du mécénat en France. Paper presented at the 
conference on La Responsabilité Globale de l’Entreprise:Un Nouveau Modèle de Régulation?, Audencia Nantes 
Ecole de Management, Nantes, France 
41 A.J. Fanto ‘Persuasion and resistance: The use of psychology by Anglo-American corporate governance 
advocates in France’ (2002) 35 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1041. 
42 Ibid. 
43 J. Dupaquier and K. Kessler, La Societe Francaise au XIXe Siecle: Tradition, transition, transformation. 
(1992) Paris: Fayard. 
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political leaning rather than their competence.44 For instance in 1987, of the 20 largest 
corporations in France, members from the ‘grandes ecoles’ held chairmanship in 14 of 
them.45   
Furthermore, in line with the country’s collective principle, post-war laws had traditionally 
involved employees in corporate management through the work council in private 
corporations with 50 or more employees. Successive governments have equally sort to 
preserve the stakeholder focus of corporations by active involvement of employees in 
management. Thus, in 1982, a law was passed that strengthened the rights of employees to be 
consulted in major restructuring of corporations. For instance, in the event of an eminent 
take-over, the “comite d’enterprise” must be consulted before the public is informed. Though 
in effect, elitism has prevented effective social dialogue between employees and 
management.46 Corporations are equally required since 1977 to submit a social report (bilan 
social) to the government, to enable the state to monitor the standard of care provided by 
corporations to employees.47  
Major changes in French corporations that led to tendencies towards the shareholder model 
commenced in mid-1990s with the privatization of large state-owned enterprises and a 
reduction in state ownership of firms.48 Before privatization, the state was the majority 
shareholder in firms and also had close connections with top corporate executives.49 Other 
changes include the reorganization of the stock market and an increase in foreign institutional 
                                                 
44 Lubatkin et al, op cit., n. 37.  
45 M. Bauer and B. Bertin-Mouro, Les 200: Comment devient-on un grand patron? (1987) Paris:Seuil. 
46 F. Chesnais, F. 1993. The French national system of innovation. In Nelson, R (ed.), National innovation 
system: A comparative anaylysis (1993) Oxford: OUP; J. Rogers and W. Streeck, Works councils: Consultation, 
representation, and cooperation in industrial relations. (1995) Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
47 M. Urminsky, ‘Rapports publics d’entreprises sur l’impact social de leurs activitiés’ [Public reports of 
companies on the social impact of their activities]. (2003) Education Ouvrière 57. 
48 M. Goyer and B. Hancke, 2004. Labour in French corporate governance: The missing link.  In Gospel, H. & 
Pendleton, A. (Eds.), Corporate and labour management: An international comparison: (2004) 173-196. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
49 Edwards, Op cit., n. 34 
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investors.50 There was also the reduction in corporate debt which transformed French 
corporations to one of the strongest financial firms in the G5.51  
Vienot 1 and 11 Reports of 1995 and 1999 respectively equally recommended corporate 
governance principles similar to those in shareholders’ states, such as the creation of the 
nomination, audit and remuneration committees. Vienot 11 also recommended that the 
conventional role of president directeur general (PDG) be held by different persons in 
companies with a unitary board and for independent directors to be included on boards.52 
Though, the above alterations indicate some element of regulatory convergence toward the 
shareholders’ model, there are strong evidence to suggest that much of the cultural aspect of 
French corporate governance have been preserved. Changes have endured the government 
stronghold in corporations, conventional stable block of shareholders, employees’ 
participation and elitism. For instance, to maintain government stronghold in corporations, 
and prevent corporate invasion by foreign firms, the privatization scheme allocated 
approximately 25% of shares to 10 larger shareholders.53 These were mostly sold to a tight-
knit group of French firms with same cross-shareholdings and interlocking boards made up of 
board members belonging to the “grandes ecoles.”54 According to Lubatkin et al, senior 
managers, directors and shareholders as well as government officials are all members of the 
same small group of elites controlling businesses and “as such it is difficult to see where 
national policy ends and firm strategies begin.”55 
Moreover, though the stock market is more developed than it was in 1990 when 
corporate reforms commenced and there is diversification of sources of finance, ownership is 
                                                 
50 Morin, F. 2000. ‘A transformation in the French model of shareholding and management’ (2000) 29 
Economy and Society 36. 
51O’Sullivan, Op cit., n. 1.  
52 M. Rubinstein, ‘Le debat sur le gouvernement d’entreprise en France: n etat des lieux’ (2002) 98 Revue 
d’economie Industrielle, 7. 
53O’Sullivan, Op cit., n.1.  
54 Lubatkin et al, op cit. n. 37. 
55 Ibid, p.882. 
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still concentrated and the capital market is relatively underdeveloped compared to those in 
the UK and US.56 In addition, the take-over law is more rigid compared to take-over laws in 
shareholders’ states. A party launching a takeover bid must consult the workers’ committee 
of the targeted firm for employees to comment if the takeover is hostile to them.57 Though a 
negative report from the employees cannot legally prevent a takeover, negative publicity 
from labor may result in government intervention in the takeover.58  
Furthermore, the law continues to provide employees with mechanism to curtail 
shareholders’ powers and participate in decision-making. For instance, labor law empowers 
employees’ representatives to convene a shareholders’ meeting and table resolutions if 
necessary. They can also appoint employees’ representatives to attend shareholders meeting. 
Another point which equally suggests reluctance of the states to adopt shareholder-oriented 
rules and principles is the Veinot report. Though it recommends that boards should have at 
least three independent directors and separate the role of chairman and CEO, it points out 
very clearly that, French firms are already implementing these principles by themselves and 
the current corporate governance framework in France is working well for the country.59 As 
Fanto mentions, the report is simple “a continuation of the French law and tradition.”60 The 
only aspect of French traditional corporate governance feature that has been revamped is 
reliance on debt, where the stock market has been developed to serve as a source of finance to 
reduce reliance on debt capital. Thus, in order to attract external capital, rules on transparency 
and accountability were strengthened. For instance, the Besson Report calls for disclosure of 
individual executive remuneration as oppose to global disclosure. But even so, corporate 
governance reforms such as Vienot and Marini Reports advocate for reforms to reflect 
                                                 
56 Fanto, Op cit., n. 36. 
57 Fanto, Op cit., no. 41. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid, p. 1070. 
13 
 
cultural values rather than replicating global trend. In fact, Vienot Report praised French 
firms for considering all stakeholders’ interest.  
Hence, alteration of French corporate governance laws towards the shareholders’ model is 
improbable as successive government policies tend to preserve ‘l'intérêt social’ enshrined in 
French corporate culture.  
  
(b) Germany  
Germany, like France, is a prototype of a stakeholder-oriented model with a collective 
orientation towards profit maximization and strategic decision making to ensure the long term 
survival of the company. The collective nature of German corporate culture is reflected in its 
co-determination law. Co-determination restricts outsiders’ control prevalent in shareholders’ 
states by allocating seats to employees on the supervisory board.61 Consequently, co-
determination is a strong part of Germany’s corporate culture as a collective society as it 
ensures the protection of public interest.62 State intervention in addressing the agency 
problem is also emblematic of the German corporate governance model.  
The collective nature of the German system also restricts excessive risk taking and 
high executive remuneration and promotes stability and long term survival of the corporation. 
The German corporate governance model also encourages a system of live employment and 
employees’ dedication. Promotion to top positions within the ranks of the company is 
therefore a common feature of the German system.   
 A further traditional trait of the German corporate governance is the relative 
underdevelopment of its capital market compared to stock markets in shareholders’ states. 
Hence, the market for corporate control is weak and takeovers rare.   
                                                 
61 C. Lane, Industry and Society in Europe: Stability and Change in Britain, Germany and France (1995) 
Aldershot: Edward Elgar; T. Heinze, ‘Transformation des Deutschen Unternehmenskontroll-System?‘ (2001) 53 
Koelner Zeitschrift f. Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie  641.   
62 Jackson and Moerke, Op cit., n. 34.  
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Ownership structure is also concentrated, while family ownership is very common in 
both medium and large firms. Cross-shareholding of non-financial firms is prevalent as is 
interlocking directorships.63 Large national banks hold substantial shares in corporations and 
banks also exercise voting rights for smaller shareholders.64  
Internationalization of capital in Germany orchestrated changes towards the 
shareholders’ model in certain areas. Lane identified similarities with the shareholders’ model 
in the reorganization of the capital market and the increase in emphasis on maximizing 
shareholders’ value.65 The stock market has also been unified and privatized to create the 
Frankfurt stock market. A single regulatory body the Federal Authority was also created to 
supervise the financial market and rules on transparency and accountability were improved. 
There was also the adoption of international accounting standard and issuing of quarterly 
report.66 In 2000, sixty-four of the top 100 companies had adopted international accounting 
standard.67 In addition, rules restricting takeovers were removed.68 Further, UK style self-
regulatory corporate governance code was introduced in 2002 with recommendations for the 
creation of committees, in particular the audit and nomination committees.69   
Apart from the above changes signifying a shift towards shareholders’ model, most of 
the defining cultural features of the German corporate governance system remain unaltered. 
This includes co-determination, the two-tier board system and collectivism as the principal 
objective of corporate enterprise. The government is also reluctant in instituting shareholders-
                                                 
63 P. Windolf, Corporate networks in Europe and the United States. (2002) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
64 U. Juegens et al, ‘Shareholder value in an adverse environment: The German case’ (2000) 29 Economy and 
Society 54. 
65 Lane, Op cit., n. 32. 
66 A. Ferner and M. Varul, The Germany way, report for the Anglo-German foundation. (1999) London: Anglo-
German Foundation. 
67 M. Goyer, ‘The transformation of corporate governance in France and Germany: The role of workplace 
institutions’ (2002)  MPlfG Working paper, No. 02/10. http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44262. 
68 Lane, Op cit., n. 32. 
69 J.K. Hopt and P. Leyens, ‘Board models in Europe – Recent developments of internal corporate governance 
structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy’ (2004) 1 European Company and Financial Law 
135. 
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oriented rules. A case in point is the takeover law applicable from 2002, which allows target 
managers to set up anti-takeover defenses if it receives the support of 75% of shareholders or 
authorized in advance by the supervisory board. In synergy with German tradition, labor 
market reforms are pro-labor and the government is of the view that reforms must be 
consensual.  
Despite the fact that Lane identifies ideological changes on the path of management 
towards Anglo-American model as a result of more managers being trained in the US and 
UK,70 the state is reluctant to institute a cultural and ideological change. Historical accounts 
of the collective nature of German corporate governance traced as far back as the 1930s, 
indicates reluctance on the part of German governments to dismantle the collective system.71 
During the crisis of 1931 and after the Second World War, the state was instrumental in 
directing corporate objectives and strategies and the outcome was the preservation of 
traditional values alongside modernization to protect public interest.72 For instance, the state 
in the past intervened in Gerling to preserve traditional company structure, in continental to 
prevent a takeover, in Allianz investment to speed up reconstruction and in Holzmann AEG 
to prevent bankruptcy.73 As a result, German organized capitalism is a blend of market 
practices and state intervention.74 As Hopner states, “traditional and modern, liberal and non-
liberal elements always co-exist.” 75  
Considering that the German system is inflexible and resistant to change, regulation 
instigating convergence towards the shareholder model is highly questionable. Core German 
                                                 
70 Lane, Op cit., n. 32.  
71 M. Hopner, ‘What connects industrial relations and corporate governance?. Explaining institutional 
complementarity’ (2005) 3 Socio-Economic Review 331; S. Vitols, The origins of bank-based financial 
systems: Germany, Japan ,and the United States. In Streech W. and Yamamura K. (Eds.), The origins of 
nonliberal capitalism, Germany and Japan in comparison (2001) 171-199. Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press. 
72 W. Streeck, The transformation of corporate organisation in Europe: An overview.  (2001) MPIfG Working 
Paper 2001-08, Cologne, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. 
73 J. Beyer, J. 2002, ‘Deutschland aga.D. deutsche bank, allianz und das verflechtungszentrum grober deutscher 
unternehmen‘ (2002) MPIfG Working Paper 2002-4, Cologne, Max-Planck-Institute for the Study of Societies. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Hopner, Op cit., n. 71, p. 343. 
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distinguishing corporate cultural values such as co-determination, consensus decision 
making, employee participation and collectivism continue to define corporate governance 
laws in Germany.   
 
2. Asian Model  
In Asia, Japan is the most studied country in convergence literature for the obvious reason 
that is it an archetype of the stakeholder model. Japan is also the World’s third largest 
economy having just been surpassed by China in 2010. As the two countries seek to maintain 
their superior economic status and in the case of China integrate into the World economic 
order, these two countries are good testing grounds for the effect of culture on the 
convergence or divergence of corporate governance.  
 
(a) Japan 
The core value of communitarianism in Japan has shaped its corporate governance rules for 
almost a century and continues to be a major factor in Japan’s corporate governance reform. 
As a collective nation, the ideology of the firm as a family unit for the benefit of the 
community rather than the maximization of profits for individual shareholders is a hallmark 
of Japan’s corporate governance model.76 Unlike in shareholders’ states where the law is 
designed to coerce performance of contracts, in Japan, the use of legal mechanisms in 
enforcing contracts is noticeably absent as the system has built a strong reputation of 
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cooperation and trust.77 Cooperation and harmony in Japan’s economic dealings is associated 
with Confucius beliefs shared by the Japanese people.78   
Banks as the main source of capital rather than the stock market is also an important 
facet of Japan’s corporate governance model. The Keiretsu system where interlocking web of 
banks act as lenders and monitors and often intervene to prevent corporate collapse is 
entrenched in Japanese corporate cultural.     
Equally, in order to guarantee the protection of different stakeholders in the 
corporation, the culture of lifetime employment and employees participation through board 
membership is a strong corporate practice in Japan.79 In concurrence with the norm of 
rewarding loyalty of employees, Board members were selected from within the company 
amongst senior managers who have served in the corporation for long periods.80 Life-time 
employment which developed following unrest after the Second World War is a strong 
feature Japan’s corporate culture, which values human capital as much as equity capital.81 In 
return, employees feel valued and motivated to improve performance as they consider 
themselves to be equal partners and residual claimants of the corporation. 
In the past decade, Japan has revised its Commercial Code which became applicable 
in 2003. The Code provides firms with the option of adopting an Anglo-American model of 
corporate governance with increase use of outside directors and the creation of the role of 
executive officer. It also reviewed its Audit Special Exception Code (ASEC) of 2002, which 
codified corporate law in the country. The ASEC allows firms to opt for Anglo-American 
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style boards with the nomination, audit and remuneration committees. Nevertheless, Japan 
has retained most of its cultural values and attributes. For instance, the ideology of the firm as 
a family unit for the benefit of the community still persists.82 Even in instances where 
shareholder-oriented style of governance is being instituted, it is done within the framework 
of Japanese culture. As an illustration, the Commercial Code skillfully incorporated 
employee’s interest as the Act on the Continuance of Employment Contract provides 
employees with a voice in decision making to ensures that their rights are firmly protected.83  
In addition, the law does not require the inclusion of independent directors on the 
board as recommended by most codes on corporate governance. Equally, unlike in 
shareholders’ state, independence is widely defined, to permit executive directors to seat on 
the board and the three committees, to protect the interest of employees.84   
Furthermore, the dual role of the board as a mechanism in charge of management and 
oversight is retained by the Commercial code in line with the Japanese corporate culture. It 
did not recommend a clear separation of the two roles as in shareholder-oriented states. In 
sum, Japan is creating a hybrid that incorporates certain shareholder-oriented principles they 
believe would enhance investment, but vividly illustrate their reluctance to embrace the 
shareholder culture. The commercial Code was drafted to accommodate their cultural beliefs 
of communitarianism and protecting employees’ interest. If the argument by Shishido85 that 
corporate governance changes in Japan is more as a result of “policy push” than “demand 
pull’ continues to hold true, then the advantages of shareholder-oriented system against 
preserving the statusquo must be shown to be beneficial to all stakeholders and not just the 
market before it is imbedded into the corporate law of Japan.   
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(b) China 
As in the case of Japan, core corporate values is embedded in Chinese socialist principles.   
Socialist traditions and values direct government’s economic policy and formal rules.86 
Chinese socialism is also inexplicably bounded in Confucianism. Confucianism places 
individuals into a family order and everyone under the control of the state.87 Its hallmark is 
developing a harmonious social structure where morality and relationship (guanxi) strives.88 
Managers are expected to be exemplary (Junzi) and epitomize honesty, hard work, respect for 
others, loyalty, fairness, modesty and frugality.89 Also, empirical research suggests that 
collectivist values are part of Chinese corporate culture and a value shared by companies.90  
In concurrence with its socialist policy, companies are state-owned and controlled by the 
government.91 State-owned enterprises (SOE) are managed to maximize wealth for the state 
as oppose to profits for the company itself.  
However, China’s quest for global economic dominance led to economic 
transformation in the last two decades. In 2001 China became a member of the World Trade 
Organization. In August 2001, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission issued a 
Guidance Opinions on the Establishment of an Independent Directors System in Listed 
Companies regulating the internal affairs of firms listed on Chinese stock exchanges and 
provides for independent directors. The law is viewed as originating from the US corporate 
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governance law and perceived by some researcher as convergence towards Anglo-Saxon 
principles.92 
SOE have also been partial privatized and the economy is moving away from a centrally 
planned economy to a market economy. The stock market was reorganized to attract capital. 
Modernization reforms also permitted some SOE to introduce western-style corporate 
structure and management system.93  
While the above changes have ushered in certain shareholder-oriented principles such 
as recommendation for independent directors to be appointed on boards, modernization and 
the pursuit of profits is balanced with Chinese socialist and Confucianism principles. For 
instance, the government preferred a two-tier board system akin to the social norms of the 
state rather than a one-tier board system common in the shareholders’ states. A supervisory 
board similar to the supervisory board in Germany is mandatory for all JSCs (Article 126 of 
the Company Law). Further evidence of non-convergence is reflected in the 2005 report of 
the Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the States Council (SASAC) 
which put forward guidelines (Guiding Opinion on strengthening the Building of Corporate 
Culture in Centrally Controlled Corporations) on corporate culture that SOE should follow.94 
The text echoes the need to strengthen socialism and build loyal Chinese citizens. Equally, 
companies are still predominantly state-owned or collectively owned by villages and 
townships even with the burgeoning of the stock market.95  
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Considering that China is a nation where the state is suspicious of organized activities not 
monitored by the government96 and is distrustful of wealth accumulation by individuals for 
fear of opposition from a powerful capitalist class,97 it is questionable that they will adopt a 
system that is highly individualistic and create wealthy powerful men who can influence the 
people. 
Events elsewhere also indicate that China is less likely to easily dismantle 
confucianism values. Like the US government effort to spread neo-liberal policies, Chinese 
government is also spreading confucianism through branches of confucius institutes present 
in all major universities in the World. Some scholars have openly expressed worries over the 
350 conficianist centres around the World in the past eight years. In 2012, the Chinese 
Ambassador to London responded to a comment made by Professor Christopher Hughes, of 
the London School of Economics expressing worries about the spread of Confucianism by 
stating that: “I think the evidence is overwhelming that the Confucius Institute does not 
measure up [to the new ethics code], because it is openly declared to be a propaganda 
organisation by the Chinese government.”98    
It is therefore evident that economic modernization and corporate governance regulation 
would continue to be implemented within the framework of Confucius values of collectivism 
and relationship, thus impeding convergence.    
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3. AFRICAN Model  
In the case of Africa, the paper examines South Africa and Nigeria. South Africa because it 
initiated corporate governance reforms in Africa with the King’s Report in 1994 and Nigeria 
because it is the emerging giant of Africa with a growing stock market and its quest of global 
recognition.   
    
(a) South Africa 
South African culture recognizes the imperative of working together in developing the 
community as oppose to individual gain. The ‘ubuntu’ belief system guides the attitude and 
behavior of South Africans and is the measuring rod for standard practice and policy.99 
Ubuntu embodies the values of caring, harmony, hospitality, respect and responsiveness.100 It 
envisages a community where there is solidarity and caring for one another. A society where 
there is reciprocity and subjection of self and the virtue of symbiosis.101 Employees are 
expected to treat each other as brothers and sisters rather than colleagues (Ahiauzu, 1986).102 
Relation is therefore very important as a tool for team building and effective communication 
in the workplace. Decisions are reached through a consensus as oppose to an individual 
making decisions for the group.103 Consultation, consensus and consent are the hallmark in 
decision-making to keep the peace and maintain stability in corporations.104 South African 
culture therefore promotes an inclusive approach and abhors exclusion.105  
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‘Ubuntu’ also prefers social wellbeing to technical rationality.106 It seeks to optimize 
efficiency rather than maximize it. In this respect, corporate objectives supported by all 
stakeholders are more important than what directors believe would maximize firm value.107  
Major corporate governance reforms in South Africa began with the issue of the 
King’s Report, which is largely an imitation of the UK corporate governance code and thus 
was more shareholder-oriented. Though the code adopted an inclusive stakeholders approach 
to complement its communal values and norms, in practice it does not provide mechanisms 
through which other stakeholders such as employees can exercise control over corporate 
affairs.108 For instance, employees are not allocated seats on the unitary board opted for by 
the code.  
The code equally recommends that the board should comprise of executive and non-
executive directors and for boards to have specialized committees, akin to the UK corporate 
governance code. In spite of the fact that the code does not directly make provisions for 
participation by other stakeholders, the Second King’s Report is slowly drifting away from 
the shareholder-oriented model by urging corporations to permit other stakeholders to 
participate in decision-making. Corporate affairs in what it refers to in page 7 as a 
“participative corporate governance system.”109 In this regard, paragraph 2.2 recommends 
that South African companies should consider the countries demography in the composition 
of the board. This is to ensure that minority groups such as poor black South Africans and 
women are represented.110 Therefore, second King’s Report extends the inclusive approach in 
the first King’s Report and by the same token recognizes the collective nature of South 
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African culture and the need to defend the cultural values of the society above the demands of 
shareholders.  
Second King’s report indicates a shift in favor of cultural values and the need for 
regulation to reflect those values. As the King Report itself admits, cultural values in South 
Africa play a crucial role in corporate governance and are considered more important than 
attracting foreign direct investment and converging towards western model. 
 
(b) Nigeria 
Traditionally, Nigeria is a communitarian society with strong respect for family and regard 
for large and extended family.111 The country is also made up of devout worshippers of God, 
irrespective of the inclination towards different religious groups.112  As Amah states, peoples’ 
thought process are mystical, based on the actions of the gods, and the spirits.113 However, 
while the local norms reflect a society with the fear of God, in practice, these values have 
been replaced with greed and corruption and an obsession with wealth. No one questions how 
wealth is acquired, including the government and everyone aspires to get rich fast.114 This 
attitude is particularly viewed as permissible because handwork, competence and dedication 
are not rewarded.115 Individuals seek quick returns and are motivated by money than 
anything else.116  
Corporate governance in Nigeria is regulated by the Companies and Allied Matters 
Act 1990 and the Nigerian Corporate Governance Code of 2003. Both are modeled on the 
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UK Companies Act of 1948,117 and UK Corporate Governance Code.118  In line with the UK 
system it is shareholder-oriented with profit maximization as the overriding goal and has 
evolved to resemble the US contractarian model.119 Nigeria is the only Sub-Saharan African 
country with a corporate governance code that does not adopt an inclusive approach contrary 
to strong evidence that it is the most effective approach for African countries.120  
An empirical study on determinants of corporate governance regulation in Nigeria 
suggests that neither the old culture of sharing nor the new culture of greed has influenced 
corporate governance regulation in Nigeria.121 According to Adegbite et al, external influence 
from colonial past and pressure from World Bank, IMF and OECD are the main sources 
influencing convergence of Nigeria’s corporate governance rules towards the shareholder 
model.122 External pressure has diluted internal norms and regulators find themselves 
powerless in the presence of powerful external actors who wield strong economic and 
political powers as a result of loans granted to Nigeria. As one interviewee in a study by 
Adegbite et al laments, “during local conferences organized by the World Bank as well as 
these American oriented bodies, these guys won’t even give one room to query what they say, 
they would just tell us that these are the best practices and that we must adopt them, in order 
to attract investments – more or less like a bully.”123 Lack of domestic voice or stakeholders’ 
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participation is aggravated by high rate of corruption, political instability, weak judiciary and 
bad leadership.124  
Nonetheless, popular opinion from within the country from scholars and businesses 
indicates a preference for a stakeholder system. For instance, a member of the drafting 
committee of the 2003 Corporate Governance Code regrets that the code adopts the 
shareholder-oriented model in this comment: “…The World Bank, IMF and OECD are very 
influential in shaping corporate governance in Nigeria. However, some of us wanted it to be 
more stakeholder- oriented like Japan, which is considered to suit our environment better. In 
this regard the efforts of the AfDB (African Development Bank) are very welcoming.”125 
AfDB is advocating for a stakeholder approach, which it argues is more in turn with the 
culture and economic environment of Nigeria. 
Unlike in the cases of the other countries in this study, Nigeria’s experience raises a 
pertinent issue of the failure of the state in diluting external pressure form donor organization. 
According to the commentator above, if they could successfully circumvent external 
pressure, they would have adopted the Japanese system which he felt is more suited to the 
Nigerian environment. Regulators in Nigeria therefore recognize the need to include local 
values and beliefs into the corporate governance framework but lack the potency to do so and 
therefore, unlike in countries with powerful governments, culture does not have any bearing 
on the corporate governance laws of Nigeria. But despite the current lack of cultural input in 
corporate governance rules in Nigeria, observations by directors and regulators as indicated 
by their statements above points to the fact that in future Nigeria may divert from the 
shareholder model as they become more independence of the World Bank, IMF, and OECD 
and the role of the AfDB in corporate governance intensifies. Also, the role of South Africa 
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as the leading economic power in Africa and the fact that all other African countries with a 
corporate governance code are opting for an inclusive approach may equally induce 
divergence of Nigeria’s corporate governance rules from the shareholders’ model. This is 
evident in the timid move towards stakeholder model in the revised Code of 2011 which 
urges the board of directors in Part B, Section 2.2 to equally protect and enhance shareholder 
values as well as to meet the company’s obligation towards employees and shareholders.126       
      
1V. CULTURE AS AN ANTIDOTE TO CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE REGULATION 
The foregoing country studies suggest that culture is a strong determinant of corporate 
governance regulation and would preserve diversity of corporate governance rules and 
principles. For instance, changes in corporate governance laws in France indicate reluctance 
on the part of the government to institute a shift towards shareholder-oriented model. In 
Germany, though the stock market is growing and there is a substantial shift in intercompany 
shareholdings and bank-industry relationship, the traditional co-determination system 
remains unaltered. China and Japan are equally maintaining their communitarian values 
which are inhibiting convergence towards shareholder-oriented model. In Africa, the pressure 
for the shareholders’ system is gradually being resisted by South Africa and in Nigeria; 
domestic support for shareholder-oriented model is weak. 
In terms of legal reform, alteration of corporate governance regulation can be observed in 
similar areas. These are areas where states seek greater accountability and transparency to 
enhance foreign direct investment such as the stock market, board composition, disclosure 
and auditing rules. This conclusion is supported by Yoshikawa and Rasheed who argue that 
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corporate governance changes are attributable to the quest for greater efficiency and 
legitimacy in the capital markets.127  
It is also worth noting that the efficiency arguments in support of convergence towards 
shareholders’ model were written during the boom years in the US and UK, when the World 
was fascinated with the free market. The recent financial crisis exposed some of the 
drawbacks of the shareholders’ model and gave rise to its re-examination. The shareholders’ 
model is therefore less attractive than it was before 2008 when the crisis began as the 
negative impact of the crisis was more severe in shareholders’ states such as the UK and US 
than stakeholders’ states such as Germany. Thus, stakeholders’ states would very cautious in 
adopting certain aspect of the shareholders’ model as they did in the past. The recent cap of 
executive remuneration by the EU is an illustration of a shift towards stakeholders’ model. 
The UK was alone in opposing the cap. The EU cap instigates an acknowledgment of the 
some of the weaknesses of the shareholders’ model.      
Conversely, laws on the core cultural defining aspects of corporate governance such as 
objectives of the firm, employee participation in decision-making and internal selection 
mechanisms have remained unchanged.  
Considering that a combination of economic, socio-cultural and political factors 
influence the design of corporate governance regulation, without political authority for 
convergence by individual states, convergence to any one particular model is improbable. 
In addition, studies on cultural evolution in East-Central Europe and the World Values 
Survey on several countries around the World indicate that culture changes very slowly and 
would often do so only after a phenomenal set of events.128 In other to compete for global 
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capital, states have restructured their rules on transparency, accountability and securities. 
However, the desire to maintain their cherished cultural values is impeding corporate 
governance convergence. Therefore, cultural differences amongst states may prove to be the 
antidote towards convergence.  
Culture has largely been overlooked in convergence literature in concluding that 
convergence towards the shareholder model is eminent. This paper argues that contrary to the 
view that the shareholder model would usurp all other models of corporate governance, 
cultural differences amongst states would prevent such an eventuality. States are resisting 
change in corporate regulation that contradicts their corporate culture and are inclined to 
preserve the status quo. Political authority for convergence is weak vis-à-vis market forces as 
policy makers are not only influenced by market forces but equally take into consideration 
domestic realities.  
Furthermore, the firm is not solely an economic entity, and is often defined based on 
cultural values. For instance Redding and Whitley view the firm in Asian culture as a 
“socially contextual phenomenon varying across cultures and historical periods.”129  
Thus, this paper highlights lack of political will for convergence. With the exception 
of Nigeria, successive governments in our selected country studies are taking measures to 
preserve their corporate culture and ideology, indicating lack of support from national 
governments for complete alteration of national corporate governance principles.  
The paper also supports the assertion that convergence of corporate governance is more 
functional than formal. At firm level, the study indicates the importance of recognizing 
respective cultural norms of individual states by multinational companies as oppose to 
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allowing the market to be the sole vehicle of firm practices as laws are embedded in cultural 
practices of states.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper demonstrates the link between cultural differences amongst states and its impact 
on divergence and convergence of corporate governance. It provides valuable theoretical 
contribution in understanding the effects of national cultural differences on the divergence of 
corporate governance regulation. It illustrates the desire of states to develop an effective 
corporate governance system within an already established social institution that would 
preserve domestic cultural values.   
Cultural differences amongst states also provide us with an understanding of why 
convergence may be functional (similar practical rules) rather than formal (similar legal 
system being used) as states are willing to regulate the market in line with recent 
developments but not prepared to amend their economic philosophy. And while cultures 
change overtime (Ajiferunke and Boddeewyn, 1970), it will requires a phenomenal set of 
events or circumstances for a culture that has been enshrined and developed for generations 
to be uprooted and replaced by a model that is disputable to be more efficient.   
History has indicated that economic consideration is not the only factor in influencing 
corporate governance regulation as political and cultural factors are equally pivotal and 
culture is proving to be a major mitigating factor against convergence of corporate 
governance rules and principles.     
  
